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1 Fed. R. Civ. P 34(a), 2006 Advisory Note, in which
the definition of ESI is said to be ‘expansive and
includes any type of information that is stored
electronically. A common example often sought in
discovery is electronic communications, such as e-
mail. The rule covers — either as documents or as
electronically stored information — information
“stored in any medium,” to encompass future
developments in computer technology. [The Rule]
is intended to be broad enough to cover all current
types of computer-based information, and flexible
enough to encompass future changes and
developments.’
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, 33, and 34.
3 For example, see, People of the State of California
v. Philip Morris, et al., Case No. J.C.C.P. 4041 (Sup.
Ct. Cal.) (December 9, 1998 consent decree
incorporating terms of Master Settlement
Agreement or ‘MSA’). These documents have for
the most part been digitized in using Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) technology, and are
available online on various web sites. See the
Legacy Tobacco Collection, available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/. The OCR portions of
the MSA collection have been used in conjunction
with the TREC Legal Track.
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The December 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have highlighted the
importance of digital evidence in U.S. civil
litigation by expressly recognizing a new term,
‘electronically stored information’ or ‘ESI.’1
References incorporating the ESI term are now to be
found in a variety of discovery contexts, including
requests for production, interrogatories, pre-trial
conferences, and what are known as initial ‘meet and
confers’, where parties are expected to discuss all
manner of issues surrounding the preservation of,
formatting of, and access to digital evidence in their
respective possession and control that might be
relevant at a later stage of legal proceedings.2 Under
these new rules, both the expectations of judges and
the behaviour of parties and their counsel are changing,
including how parties are approaching the task of
searching for relevant digital evidence in response to
discovery obligations. In a remarkable series of recent
court decisions, judges have questioned, challenged,
and even applied sanctions against parties for their
failure to act reasonably in conducting what are known
as ‘keyword’ searches for ESI. This is a new
development in the law, with far-reaching implications
not only on the civil side of practice, but potentially also
with respect to how digital evidence is gathered in at
least certain forms of criminal proceedings in the U.S. as
well.
Only a few years ago, the idea that there would be a
jurisprudence devoted to analyzing the strengths and
limitations of keyword searching would be unheard of,
for at least two reasons. First, until recent times,
discovery practice, even in the largest and most
complex cases in the U.S., consisted entirely of paper
productions of documents, sometimes in admittedly
massive quantities. For example, just short of ten
million documents in hard copy form have been
amassed in a repository, pursuant to a Master
Settlement Agreement, between a variety of State
Attorneys General and the tobacco industry.3
Second, with the advent of proprietary computerized
databases of case law, represented most prominently by
Westlaw and Lexis, lawyers have become well versed in
conducting keyword searches to find relevant case
precedent for use in legal pleadings and briefs. The
beauty of keyword searching in this context is that no
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lawyer wishes or needs to read more than a handful of
cases as an aid in stating a legal position in writing,
except in the rare instance where more exhaustive
searches are necessary to be performed. In contrast, the
limitations of keyword searching become more apparent
as the task changes from finding case precedent to
finding ‘all’ relevant evidence related to the discovery
topic at hand. This has become especially clear with the
exponential growth of databases and data stores of all
kinds, especially with respect to electronic mail.4
The Sedona Conference’s commentary on search and
information retrieval methods explains the strengths
and weaknesses of keyword searching this way:
Keyword searches work best when the legal inquiry is
focused on finding particular documents and when
the use of language is relatively predictable. For
example, keyword searches work well to find all
documents that mention a specific individual or date,
regardless of context.  However, . . . the experience of
many litigators is that simple keyword searching
alone is inadequate in at least some discovery
contexts. This is because simple keyword searches
end up being both over- and under-inclusive in light
of the inherent malleability and ambiguity of spoken
and written English (as well as all other languages).5
The Sedona Search Commentary describes how
keywords have the potential to miss documents that fail
to contain the word either because other terms with the
same meaning have been used, or due to common or
inadvertently misspelled instances of the keyword term.
The Commentary then goes on at length to describe a
variety of alternative search methods that exist, starting
with the use of Boolean operators to construct
sophisticated search strings, to the use of fuzzy logic,
statistical techniques, and taxonomies and ontologies.6
The Commentary makes the point that lawyers ‘are
beginning to feel more comfortable’ using these forms
of alternative search tools, based on anecdotal evidence
from a small (but increasing) number of companies and
law firms.7
Although the limitations of keyword searching have
been well-known to the library and information science
communities for decades, and while as early as 1985
the Blair & Maron study8 underscored the disconnect
between what lawyers believe they retrieve and what is
actually retrieved when using keywords,9 nevertheless,
U.S. jurisprudence has only recently begun to grapple
with the problems inherent in the task of conducting a
reasonable search for all the needles in what turn out to
be very large e-haystacks.
Thus, in only a short interval of time some courts have
gone from extolling the power of keyword searching to
questioning its efficacy (at least as articulated by
counsel). Compare the case of In re Lorazepam &
Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, 300 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46
(D.D.C. 2004) (‘[t]he glory of electronic information is
not merely that it saves space but that it permits the
computer to search for words or ‘strings’ of text in
seconds,’ to U.S. v. O’Keefe, 537 F.Supp.2d 14, 24
(D.D.C. 2008):
Whether search terms of ‘keywords’ will yield the
information sought is a complicated question
involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of
computer technology, statistics, and linguistics. . . .
Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare
opine that a certain search term or terms would be
more likely to produce information than the terms
that were used is truly to go where angels fear to
tread.
Until mid-2007, the overarching approach taken by a
number of courts in this area has been to define the
reasonableness of the search conducted by a party
solely in terms of the number of keyword terms being
requested as well as their relevance to the subject at
hand. Thus, in the case of In re Lorazepam, the district
court endorsed the employment of a number of search
terms as a reasonable means of narrowing the
production for relevant ESI. In another case, as few as
four keyword search terms were found to be sufficient.10
In certain decisions, the court has ordered a responding
party (usually the defendant) to conduct searches using
the keyword terms provided by plaintiff.11 In other cases,
judges that have taken a more activist approach have
attempted to force parties to cooperate on reaching an
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4 George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron, ‘Information
Inflation: Can The Legal System Adapt?,’ 13
Richmond J. of Law & Tech. 10 (2007), available at
http://richmond,edu/jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf.
5 The Sedona Conference® Best Practices
Commentary on the Use of Search and Information
Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery (Sedona Search
Commentary), 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 201 (2007),
available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
publications. See also George L. Paul and Jason R.
Baron, ‘Information Inflation: Can The Legal
System Adapt?,’ 13 Richmond J. of Law & Tech. 10
(2007), n. 4.
6 Sedona Search Commentary, 8 Sedona Conf. J. at
202-03; 217 (Appendix describing alternative
search methods at greater length). 
7 Sedona Search Commentary, 8 Sedona Conf. J. at
202-03.
8 David C. Blair and M. E. Maron, ‘An evaluation of
retrieval effectiveness for a full-text document-
retrieval system,’ Communications of the ACM,
289 (1985) (discussed at further length in Sedona
Search Commentary, 8 Sedona Conf. J. at 206.
9 Sedona Search Commentary, 8 Sedona Conf. J. at
204-06.
10 J.C. Associates v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co., 2006
WL 1445173 (D.D.C. 2006).
11 For example, see Medtronic Sofamor Danck, Inc. v.
Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
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agreement for a reasonable search protocol, including
that the use of certain search terms.12
On June 1, 2007, U.S. Magistrate Judge John Facciola
issued an opinion in the case of Disability Rights
Council of Greater Washington v. Metropolitan Transit
Authority,13 in which for the first time in published case
law a judge suggested that parties contemplate the use
of an alternative to merely reaching a set of keywords
by consensus. The dispute in question involved disabled
individuals and an advocacy group bringing an action
against a local transit authority alleging that
inadequacies in para-transit services amounted to
disability discrimination. The plaintiffs moved to compel
the production of electronic documents residing on
backup tapes in the defendants’ possession. After
engaging in a routine balancing analysis of the
considerations set out in Rule 26(a), the court ordered
that some form of restoration of the backup tapes be
ordered to recover relevant documents. It is at this
juncture that the opinion breaks new ground: Facciola J
expressly required that counsel meet and confer and
prepare for his signature a ‘stipulated protocol’ as to
how the search of the backup tapes would be
conducted, and pointed out ‘I expect the protocol to
speak to at least the following concerns,’ including both
‘How will the backup tapes be restored?’, and
Once restored, how will they be searched to reduce
the electronically stored information to information
that is potentially relevant? In this context, I bring to
the parties’ attention recent scholarship that argues
that concept searching, is more efficient and more
likely to produce the most comprehensive results.14
Following this decision and the publication of the
Sedona Search Commentary in August 2007, was the
case of U.S. v. O’Keefe,15 another decision written by
Facciola J, including a discussion on the use of search
protocols. The O’Keefe case involved the defendant
being indicted on the charge that as a State Department
employee living in Canada, he received gifts and other
benefits from his co-defendant, in return for expediting
visa requests for his co-defendant’s company
employees. The district court judge in the case had
previously required that the government ‘conduct a
thorough and complete search of both its hard copy and
electronic files in a good faith effort to uncover all
responsive information in its possession custody or
control.’16 This in turn entailed a search of paper
documents and electronic files, including for e-mails,
that ‘were prepared or received by any consular officers’
at various named posts in Canada and Mexico, ‘that
reflect either policy or decisions in specific cases with
respect to expediting visa applications.’17
The defendants insisted that the government search
both active servers and certain designated backup
tapes. The government conducted a fairly well-
documented search, as described in a declaration
placed on file with the court, in which 19 specific named
individuals were identified as being within the scope of
the search, along with certain identified existing
repositories by name and the files of at least one former
member of staff. The declarant went on to describe the
search string used was as follows:
‘early or expedite* or appointment or early &
interview or expedite* & interview.’18
Upon review of the results, only those documents
‘clearly about wholly unrelated matters’ were removed,
for example, ‘emails about staff members’ early
departures or dentist appointments.’ Nevertheless, the
defendants objected that the search terms used were
inadequate. This led Facciola J to state that on the
record before him, he was not in a position to judge
whether the search was reasonable or adequate, and
that given the complexity of the issues he did not wish
‘to go where angels fear to tread.’ He went on to note,
citing to the use of ‘expert’ testimony under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702:
This topic is clearly beyond the ken of a layman and
requires that any such conclusion be based on
evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of Rule
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12 Treppel v. Biovail, 233 F.R.D. 363, 368-69 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (court describes plaintiff’s refusal to
cooperate with defendant in the latter’s
suggestion to enter into a stipulation defining the
keyword search terms to be used as a ‘missed
opportunity,’ and goes on to require that certain
terms be used); see also Alexander v. FBI, 194
F.R.D. 316 (D.D.C. 2000) (court places limitations
on the scope of plaintiffs’ proposed keywords in a
case involving White House e-mail).
13 2007 WL 1585452 (D.D.C.).
14 Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v.
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2007 WL 1585452
(D.D.C.), 242 F.R.D. at 148 (with reference to
George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron, ‘Information
Inflation: Can The Legal System Adapt?,’ 13
Richmond J. of Law & Tech. 10 (2007), n. 4). In
contrast to keyword searching, which relies on set-
based searching using simple keywords or word
combinations, with or without Boolean and related
operators (such as ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘!’), concept
searching involves language modeling and/or the
use of probabilistic techniques to find relevant
documents that nevertheless may not anywhere in
them have the arbitrarily selected ‘keyword.’ See
George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron, ‘Information
Inflation: Can The Legal System Adapt?,’ 13
Richmond J. of Law & Tech. 10 (2007), n. 4, at 42-
43.
15 537 F.Supp.2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008).
16 537 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (quoting U.S. v. O’Keefe,
2007 WL 1239204, at *3 (D.D.C. April 27, 2007))
(internal quotations omitted).
17 537 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
18 Based only on what is known from the opinion, it is
admittedly somewhat difficult to parse the syntax
used in this search string. One is left to surmise
that the ambiguity present on the face of the
search protocol may have contributed to the court
finding the matter of adjudicating a proper search
strong to be too difficult a task.
175© Pario Communications Limited, 2008                                www.deaeslr.org Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 5
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, if
defendants are going to contend that the search
terms used by the government were insufficient, they
will have to specifically so contend in a motion to
compel and their contention must be based on
evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.19
Whether it is the view of Facciola J that expert opinion
testimony must be introduced in all cases on the subject
of the reasonableness of the search method or protocol
employed immediately generated discussion in
subsequent case law and commentary.20
However, another remarkable aspect of the opinion
has not been widely commented upon, namely, that the
court chose to look to federal civil litigation practice as
guidance as to how to conduct discovery in a criminal
case, by essentially importing novel and emerging e-
discovery best practices into the criminal law arena. As
stated in O’Keefe:
In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to
which the courts can look for guidance in
determining whether the production of documents by
the government has been in a form or format that is
appropriate. This may be because the ‘big paper’
case is the exception rather than the rule in criminal
cases. Be that as it may, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure speak specifically to the form of
production. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
their present form are the product of nearly 70 years
of use and have been consistently amended by
advisory committees consisting of judges,
practitioners, and distinguished academics to meet
perceived deficiencies. It is foolish to disregard them
merely because this is a criminal case, particularly
where, as in the case here, it is far better to use these
rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production
of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the
same problems.
This line of analysis opens up the possibility that
there may emerge a jurisprudence of best practice on
the subject of keyword searching, and its alternatives
may yet find fertile ground in connection with the
U.S. criminal docket.21 
Most recently, U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm has
substantially contributed to the development of a
jurisprudence of information retrieval, through issuance
of a comprehensive opinion on the subject of privilege
review in Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.22 At
issue was whether the manner in which privileged
documents were selected from a larger universe of
relevant evidence was sufficient to protect a party from
waiver of attorney-client privilege, where 165 privileged
documents were provided to the opposing counsel as
the result of a keyword search. At the outset, Judge
Grimm reported that ‘he ordered the parties’ computer
forensic experts to meet and confer in an effort to
identify a joint protocol to search and retrieve relevant
ESI’ in response to the plaintiff’s document requests.
The protocol ‘contained detailed search and information
retrieval instructions, including nearly five pages of
keyword/phrase search terms.’23
The defendants’ counsel subsequently informed the
court that they would be conducting a separate review
to filter privileged documents from the larger [universe]
of 4.9 gigabytes of text-searchable files and 33.7
gigabytes of non-searchable files. In doing so, they
claimed to use seventy keywords to distinguish
privileged from non-privileged documents; however,
Judge Grimm, applying a form of heightened scrutiny to
the assertions of counsel, found that their
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19 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
20 Equity Analytics v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C.
2008) (stating that in O’Keefe ‘I recently
commented that lawyers express as facts what are
actually highly debatable propositions as to
efficacy of various methods used to search
electronically stored information,’ Judge Facciola
requires an expert to describe scope of proposed
search); See the later discussion of Victor Stanley,
Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md.
May 29, 2008).
21 The digital evidence burden of production on the
government, as outlined in O’Keefe, arose under
Rule 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states in relevant part that the
government ‘must permit the defendant to inspect
and to copy . . . papers, documents, data, . . . or
copies or portions of any of these items, if the item
is within the government's possession, custody, or
control and (i) the item is material to preparing the
defense; [or] (ii) the government intends to use the
item in its case-in-chief at trial . . .
The propriety of keyword searching has also arisen
in the very different context of ‘search and seizure’
criminal law under the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, which provides for the right of
the people to be secure in their ‘papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’ The Fourth Amendment has a ‘specificity
requirement’ that ‘prevents officers from engaging
in general, exploratory searches by limiting their
discretion and providing specific guidance as to
what can and cannot be searched and seized.’ U.S.
v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006). In
Adjani, the Court of Appeals held that seizure of an
entire computer, as opposed to conducting a
targeted search of its contents on the premises,
not to be unreasonable, stating that ‘[t]o require
such a pinpointed computer search restricting the
search to an email program or to specific search
terms, would likely have failed to cast a sufficiently
wide net to capture the evidence sought’). The
court went on to note that ‘[c]omputer files are
easy to disguise or rename, and were we to limit
the warrant to such a specific search protocol,
much evidence could escape discovery because of
[defendants’] labeling of the files’ at 1150. A
subsequent line of authority has generally reached
a similar result. See U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006); U.S. v.
Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir, 2006). It remains to be
determined in future case law whether further
importation of ‘best practices’ standards from civil
practice on the subject of keyword searching and
its alternatives may yet serve to influence Fourth
Amendment practice.
22 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008).
23 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008) at *1.
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representations fell short of being sufficient for
purposes of explaining why mistakes took place in the
production of the documents and in so doing, avoiding
waiver. In the court’s words:
[T]he Defendants are regrettably vague in their
description of the seventy keywords used for the
text-searchable ESI privilege review, how they were
developed, how the search was conducted, and what
quality controls were employed to assess their
reliability and accuracy. . . . [N]othing is known from
the affidavits provided to the court regarding their
[the parties’ and counsel’s] qualifications for
designing a search and information retrieval strategy
that could be expected to produce an effective and
reliable privilege review….
[W]hile it is universally acknowledged that keyword
searches are useful tools for search and retrieval of
ESI, all keyword searches are not created equal; and
there is a growing body of literature that highlights
the risks associated with conducting an unreliable or
inadequate keyword search of relying exclusively on
such searches for privilege review.24
The opinion goes on to set out at length the limitations
of keyword searching, and the need for sampling of the
results of such searches, finding that there was no
evidence that the defendant did anything but turn over
all documents to plaintiff that were identified as the
result of the keywords used as non-privileged. Later in
the opinion, in several lengthy footnotes, Judge Grimm
first goes on to describe what alternatives exist to
keyword searching (including fuzzy search models,
Bayesian classifiers, clustering, and concept and
categorization tools), citing the Sedona Search
Commentary,25 and second, provides a mini-law review
essay on the subject of whether Judge Facciola’s recent
opinions in O’Keefe and Equity Analytics should be read
to require expert testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 be presented to the finder of fact in every
case involving the use of search methodologies. In
Judge Grimm’s view:
Viewed in its proper context, all that O’Keefe and
Equity Analytics required was that the parties be
prepared to back up their positions with respect to a
dispute involving the appropriateness of ESI search
and information retrieval methodology – obviously an
area of science or technology – with reliable
information from someone with the qualifications to
provide helpful opinions, not conclusory argument by
counsel. . . . The message to be taken from O’Keefe
and Equity Analytics, and this opinion is that when
parties decide to use a particular ESI search and
retrieval methodology, they need to be aware of
literature describing the strengths and weaknesses
of various methodologies, such as [the Sedona
Search Commentary] and select the one that they
believe is most appropriate for its intended task.
Should their selection be challenged by their
adversary, and the court be called upon to make a
ruling, then they should expect to support their
position with affidavits or other equivalent
information from persons with the requisite
qualifications and experience, based on sufficient
facts or data and using reliable principles or
methodology.26
The new case law on search and information retrieval
thus amounts to a change in the way things were
before, for both the bar and the bench: counsel has a
duty to fairly articulate how they have gone about the
task of finding relevant digital evidence, rather than
assume that there is only one way to go about doing so
with respect to ESI (for example, using keywords), even
if the task appears to be a trivial or uninteresting one to
perform. Arguably, the ‘reasonableness’ of one’s actions
in this area will be judged in large part on how well
counsel, on behalf of his or her client, has documented
and explained the search process and the methods
employed. In an increasing number of cases, courts can
be expected not to shirk from applying some degree of
searching scrutiny to counsel’s actions with respect to
information retrieval. This may be greeted as an
unwelcome development by some, but comes as an
inevitable consequence of the heightened scrutiny
being applied to all aspects of e-discovery in the wake
of the newly revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Given the decisions in Disability Rights, O’Keefe, and
Creative Pipe, it seems certain that in a few years’ time
there will be large and increasing jurisprudence
discussing the efficacy of various search methodologies
as employed in litigation. The Sedona Search
Commentary has aimed to serve as a guide, and
includes within it eight practice pointers for the legal
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24 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008) at *3.
25 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008) at n. 9.
26 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008) at n. 10.
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community to consider. In addition, the Sedona Search
Commentary asks the question, ‘What prospects exist
for improving present day search and retrieval
methodologies?’27 This author’s sense is that lawyers
can improve upon their present-day search techniques
through a number of strategies that do not necessarily
rely in turn on improvements in search technology;
these would include, but not be limited to, improving
lawyers’ knowledge of and ability to construct
meaningful Boolean strings, and following Sedona’s
practice point guidance.
Beyond these observations, at least one continuing
research project with an international dimension has
shown promise in making advances in this general area.
The Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) Legal Track,
sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology, has as its aim the evaluation of search
methodologies used in a legal context.28 Preliminary
results from the first two years of the track have shown
that a large gap exists between the number of relevant
documents retrieved as the result of Boolean searches,
and the number of relevant documents cumulatively
found by other types of search methods used by
information scientists participating in the track.29 In its
third year, an open call to the legal service provider
community is expected to yield greater participation in
TREC.30 
As this and other research projects continue, the
Sedona Search Commentary has gone on record as
expressing two recommendations:
1. The legal community should support collaborative
research with the scientific and academic sectors
aimed at establishing the efficacy of a range of
automated search and information retrieval
methods.
2. The legal community should encourage the
establishment of objective benchmarking criteria,
for use in assisting lawyers in evaluating the
competitive legal and regulatory search and
retrieval services market.
It is certainly this author’s hope that engaging in
interdisciplinary research and establishing evaluative
criteria may yet go a long way towards advancing the
aim of the legal profession in seeking ways to ensure
the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ determination of
every action, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.
© Jason R. Baron, 2008
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27 Sedona Search Commentary, 8 Sedona Conf. J. at
212.
28 http://trec-legal.umiacs.umd.edu/.
29 Stephen Tomlinson, Douglas W. Oard, Jason R.
Baron, and Paul Thompson, ‘TREC-2007 Legal
Track Overview,’ 2007 Fifteenth Text Retrieval
Conference (TREC 2007) Proceedings, available at
http://trec-legal.umiacs.umd.edu/ (78 per cent of
relevant documents identified in year 2 were found
by search methods other than using Boolean and
keyword searching). See generally, Jason R. Baron,
‘The TREC Legal Track: Origins and Reflections on
the First Year,’ 8 Sedona Conf. J. 251 (2007).
30 See ‘An Open Letter To Law Firms and Companies
In The Legal Tech Sector,’ available at http://trec-
legal.umiacs.umd.edu/, and referenced at n. 10 of
Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe.
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